Demographic Processes in the Countries of Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic: Trends in the 1990s and What We Should Expect in the Next Decade

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This report seeks to analyze the demographic processes in Eastern Europe, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and the Baltic, which until recently comprised the core of the so-called “socialist camp.” The contents of this report apply to the region that includes the following countries (listed in alphabetical order in English): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia—TFYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Information on Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) is also provided in certain instances.

The radical changes, which transpired in the final decade of the twentieth century, in the economic and political structure of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic, rendered a profound influence on the aggregate of social relationships, in one way or another influencing the demographic processes in these countries. Further, this report will examine detailed instances and the specific character of the demographic changes in the aforementioned countries, including their perspectives for the upcoming decade. First, however, it is necessary to emphasize the two following factors:

1. Despite concrete peculiarities in the economic and social processes in the countries of this region, all have already entered a phase of depopulation, stand on its threshold, or are approaching it.

2. The character and dynamics of the demographic processes in these countries, especially of fertility, in their main characteristics do not depend on the concrete peculiarities of the economic and social development in these countries, inasmuch as the global processes that have a universal character. First of all, and in particular, changes in the place and role of the social institution of the family in society, changes which have received the title institutional crisis of the family, and which have been brought about by the fundamental restructuring of the whole economic structure of society, and by a transition to an economy of the industrial and post-industrial type. In addition, it is impossible to negate the fact that the specific character of the transition period, experienced by Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic, and the peculiarities of the economic and social processes within those countries, have somewhat influenced the demographic processes: foremost mortality, but also the marriage and divorce rates.

The fundamental contents of the economic transformation in these countries consist of a turning away from a centrally-planned economy and a transition to market-economy interactions.

Although these transformations began in the various countries of the region at different times and were accomplished by different means (the method of “shock therapy” or more gradually and inconsistently, with varying degrees of criminalization, etc.), their economic and social consequences were similar in many ways. All of these countries experienced a decline in economic production, the depth and duration of which, of course, were different in different countries; nonetheless, in all these instances the decline led to a drop in the standard of living among the population, an increase (at times, explosive) in social stratification, and a degradation or complete cancellation of social programs.

The dynamics of the fundamental economic indicators, according to data from the International Bank, are shown by data on the mid-year growth rates of real per capita GDP; the countries of Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic suffered a sharp economic recession in the 1990s. These data produce a particularly stark impression if compared to the corresponding data for other countries, especially to the USA, Canada, and Western Europe.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the data shows average rates of growth (and decline) in GDP for the entire decade from 1990 to 1999. In the first years after the beginning of reforms, the decline in production in these countries was still more dramatic, even in those countries that on the whole have a positive growth rate for GDP (i.e., Albania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic). For example, for the first three years of reform in Poland and Hungary, the drop in production was 17–18 percent, and in a united Czechoslovakia was twenty-five percent from the 1989 level.1

The decline in production in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic far exceeded any that had been observed in any of the Western countries after the end of World War II. Furthermore, although some Eastern European countries, according to 1990s standards, have been able to enter positive territory in terms of mid-year rates of GDP growth, the countries of the Baltic and CIS have not achieved pre-reform levels of production.2

Naturally, the decline in production has played out on the standard of living in most of the population, because it has signified an absolute lessening in the volume of resources...
that society uses to satisfy human demand for material goods and services. Another important factor in the decline in the standard of living is inflation, which like a wildfire, metaphorically speaking, engulfed all former socialist countries: especially in the very beginning of the transition period. Inflation—in particular inflation that has reached a relatively low threshold and has become hyperinflation—is an absolute economic disaster, in that it leads to catastrophic consequences for the economy, government budget, and most of all, the welfare of the overwhelming majority of the country's population. As authors of the above-quoted work, The Labor Market and Social Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, write:

Inflation destabilizes price structure and reflects extremely negatively on redistribution processes. Salaries in the government sector fall rapidly, and this very thing undermines stimuli to work in such conditions. For this reason corruption flourishes in significant measure. Underhanded businessmen flourish, while the standard of living declines for workers who directly contribute with their labor to the process of production, and their savings evaporate into thin air. Citizens hate governments that tolerate such a situation.\(^5\)

Even if in different degrees, the countries of Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic have all tasted the fruits of galloping inflation, especially impetuous in the first years after the beginning of reforms, which inflation undermined and discredited the goals for which the reforms were originally proclaimed, along with the reforms themselves.

During the final decade of the past century, mid-year rates of price increase in Eastern Europe stood at almost 57 percent, which had increased 143 times over the whole decade. In the CIS and the Baltic, prices during these years increased by a mid-year rate of 131 percent, skyrocketing by ten thousand times. According to the International Bank, prices in the Ukraine soared fastest of all, with a mid-year rate of 413 percent.\(^4\) During the 1990s in Russia, prices increased five thousand-fold (a mid-year rate of 116 percent).

Only at the very end of the indicated decade did inflation rates begin to drop noticeably; however, they remain far ahead of the developed countries of the West. For example, in the year 2000 in the CIS, the Consumer Price Index fluctuated from 102.2 percent to 207.5 percent in respect to 1999. During the same time in the West, nowhere did this index exceed 104 percent.\(^5\)

A significant peculiarity of the economic and social situation in countries of the region is a sharp drop in the standard of living of the majority of the population and a widening of economic and social inequality.

According to consensus, the above-mentioned phenomenon is a normal consequence of economic liberalization, which moves forward as a driving force of change, inasmuch as it creates a stimulus to more productive, more effective, labor.\(^6\) It is possible that this is so. But the degree to which these phenomena are occurring in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic is such that it threatens not only social and political stability, but also the survival of the poorest classes, whose proportion of the total population is very high. We do not have the opportunity to explore this question in detail. However, the level of economic stratification in the CIS and the Baltic is especially great. The size of the Gini Index offers great insight into this situation, as it measures the level of inequality in the allocation of income or consumption. In the CIS and the Baltic, the size of this index is maximal among the delineated groups of the country, with the exception of the group All Other, which combines the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the level of poverty is even greater than the region which this report is dedicated to. There also exists a significant differential in the level of poverty in Eastern Europe, as well as in economic inequality. The economic stratification in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic according to conditions in the mid-1990s (using data from the International Bank) shows the greatest level of economic inequality exists in Russia.

The virtual collapse of the social environment played a negative role in the dynamics of the level of national welfare in many countries of the region under the pretext of a need for a transition to market principles—achievements in the social milieu were rejected, which in spite of everything had a place in these countries before the beginning of the economic transformation. The abrupt impoverishment of large masses of the population was not accompanied by measures, directed at social support for the destitute, but by a deprivation or reduction in their access to vitally necessary items—foremost, to groceries, clothing, public utilities, but also to education and high-quality health care services. And if we factor in the growth in unemployment, and, accordingly, the uncertainty of tomorrow’s outcome, it becomes clear that the sharp drop in the quality of life absolutely had an effect on the dynamics of such demographic processes such as mortality, the marriage rate, and the divorce rate. In a significantly smaller degree, all of this affected fertility, the dynamics of which, as was stated earlier in this report, are determined by deep-laid factors of a more fundamental nature.

Let’s examine the dynamics of the demographic processes in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic on the 1990s. We will begin with the dynamics of population numbers. The latter may be characterized as depopulation,\(^7\) or a reduction in population, which began in the European part of the former USSR in the beginning of the 1990s. However, depopulation began even earlier—in the mid-1980s—in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia. In all of these instances, depopulation began after the potential for demographic
growth was exhausted, which potential was latent in the demographic structure.

In the next fifteen years, depopulation will consume another eighteen countries, and the only exception seems to be Central Asian countries (except Kazakhstan): Azerbaijan and Albania—that is, governments with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Moreover, if between 1975–1999 the general population of all countries in the region grew by 44.6 million, and the population of the four depopulating countries shrank by 1.3 million, then during the period until 2015 the expected decline in population is 14.9 million, and in the eighteen depopulating countries, 25.7 million. In the following years, rates of depopulation will increase and depopulation will claim even those countries in the region where population growth is still present. In connection with this, let’s examine in greater detail a few countries of the CIS and the Baltic, i.e., the former Soviet Republics. As noted earlier, from this group, only Estonia and Latvia shrank in population size between 1975 and 1999 (in total by 10 thousand people). For the period until 2015, the expected decline in population of these countries will be 21.6 million people, and the total of depopulating countries will reach ten on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, if between 1975–1999 the mid-year rates of population change in the CIS and Baltic were 0.93 percent (at a minimum of -0.1 percent and a maximum of 2.5 percent with a standard deviation of 0.887), then between 1999 and 2015 these rates are projected to be at 0.073 percent (with a minimum of -1.1 percent and a maximum of 1.7 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.885).

According to the prognoses of UN specialists, depopulation will in the future engulf practically all of Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic. In the middle of the current century, the population in all of these countries will have begun shrinking, although the time of transition will vary in countries where population is still growing. In accordance with the mid-level variant for the UN projection for the year 2000, the greatest reduction in population is expected in Estonia (-46.1%), Bulgaria (-43.0%), Ukraine (39.6%), and Georgia (38.8%). Russia’s population will shrink by 28.3%. It behooves us again to underscore that the main factor in depopulation is low and super-low fertility. Mortality plays virtually no role. Calculations of the Russian demographer V.A. Borissov show that mortality is responsible for only 2 percent of the total population loss.

In Eastern Europe, the Baltic, and the greater part of the CIS, not only are fertility levels some of the lowest in the world, but scientists are not discovering any signs of stabilization, let alone increase. As we will show later, using Russia as an example, according to the most optimistic projection of population dynamics, depopulation will cease at the earliest by 2050.

We will examine official data on the size of the common coefficients of fertility (the Crude Birth Rate) in the CIS and the Baltic since 1987, when fertility levels began to slide universally in the former USSR following a short-lived increase in the number of first and second births.

However, not only the Crude Birth Rate is declining. The total fertility rate is also dropping universally. In the majority of countries, these numbers have fallen below total replacement levels. According to this indicator, Russia (1.214 in 2000) is at the same level with countries that have extremely low fertility such as Germany, Italy, Greece, and Spain, where between 1995 and 2000 total fertility was between 1.1 and 1.3 children per woman and where the standard of living is much higher than in Russia. Total fertility rates are just as low in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, and Moldavia.

Kazakhstan (1.8) and Azerbaijan (2.0) also are part of the group of countries whose total fertility rate is lower than simple population replacement levels. In Turkmenistan, the total fertility rate is slightly higher than replacement levels at 2.2. Only in three countries—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—does the populace continue a regime of expanded reproduction of population. Thus, most of the former Soviet republics, and now the independent countries of the CIS and the Baltic, have entered a new millennium with fertility levels too low to replace the previous generation.

As was earlier mentioned, it is in no way mortality that plays the decisive role in the dynamics of depopulation, but low and super-low fertility. Nonetheless, we will briefly pause to discuss the dynamics of mortality in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic, inasmuch as mortality is the demographic process, which in greater measure than other processes, depends on changes in the current socio-economic conditions.

The drop in the standard of living and the virtual collapse of the former public health system in countries of the region in the 1990s became one of the factors that instigated a practically universal increase in mortality and a decrease in average life expectancy. Of course, the depth and duration of this drop varied in different countries, but the sheer fact of the lowering does not lend itself to any doubt. Especially strong was the increase in mortality on the territory of the former Soviet Union, even though this process was not uniform here either.

In line with a rise in the standard of living (betterment of living, hygiene conditions, and upswing in public health programs, etc.), average life expectancy will rise, and the only question that remains is how this will happen and when. The situation with fertility is qualitatively different and much more complicated, because an increase in prosperity does not automatically lead to an increase in fertility. On the other hand, it will cause a revolution in the system of social
orientation and expectations sooner, which results if most of the new additional income goes in pursuit of fulfilling the most prestigious wants. Therefore, those who consider that monetary difficulties inhibit growth in fertility are wrong.

This is a very widespread delusion, which often becomes fixated in public opinion polls. For example, in “Special Report: Results of Global Survey on Marriage and the Family” (WCF II, Geneva, 1999) it says that 50 percent of those polled in the whole world and 50 percent of European respondents think that money and financial difficulties can cause a couple not to increase the number of children in their family.

In fact, as data shows from sociological research we conducted between 1976–2001, the only hindrance to bearing several children is the absence of corresponding social norms and wanting a family with three to four children. If we compare respondents who experience this desire for children with those who do not experience this desire, the frequency of references to these hindrances, including financial hardships, is two to three times greater among the former group than among the latter. In addition, those who feel a need to have a third child also name such circumstances as age, health conditions, lessening of fecundity, and familial interrelationships.

As another feature of the aforementioned, the all-Russian investigation on urban families in Russia has shown that among respondents who think that their monthly income is absolutely insufficient and are continually forced to borrow money before payday, three-child families are almost twice as infrequent as one-child families and three-plus times as infrequent as two-child families (15.5% versus 51.5%). In other words, where there are more troubles with children and, probably, more worries, there are the least amount of references to difficulties and hindrances. This way, the appeal of one-child and two-child families to these hindrances does not tie into real hardships, and all these references simply reflect the extra-familial tendency of values, the action of a social convention of having fewer children (one to two children).

From this, the necessity becomes evident of calculating genuine reproductive orientations and attitudes at the same time we are working out demographic forecasts. In Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic, the dynamics of the total fertility rate in the 1990s were overwhelmingly influenced by a slow steadily decreasing desire to have children, but, alas, the nature of the total fertility rate does not allow us to separate out exactly the input of structure and the input of reproductive behavior (the latter is particularly difficult to measure, in addition to the fertility rate’s slowing decline as it approaches 1.0). Nevertheless, if we assume that in the next decade (2001–2010) there will be a decline in the intensity of fertility and that the general reproductive attitude will remain as it has been, then the total fertility rate may slump below 1.0 in the aforementioned countries, and sink even lower than 0.9 births per woman of childbearing age.

The data from selected research of individual opinions about reproductive habits show that perspectives on achieving a desired family size of two children are waning. They are useful in that they show the limitations of actions of measures of material stimulation, along with their secondary character. These data refute the stereotype that by improving living conditions, the desire for more children will strengthen. Material indicators that increase prosperity are able only to facilitate conditions for bringing about a desire for children and not the conditions for stopping an intergenerational weakening in the desire for children (for which a special program for strengthening solid, inseparable families with several children is required).

If we do not implement such a program in the formerly described countries, and just allow it to function itself, then the general reproductive attitude will waiver between 1.3–1.4 children per woman, through which a new social norm of having one child will take root among newlywed cohorts and new generations. In this case, the total fertility rate (TFR) would fluctuate between 1.15 and 1.17. The longer this “self-flow” of the TFR exists (the absence of a pronatal political policy), the more likely the general reproductive attitude is to sink to 1.0–1.1 and the total fertility rate to 0.9.

This forecast will not come true if an active demographic policy is begun (in the words of A. Carlson, “The Free Politics of Free People”) that will increase the proportion of families with three to four children. It is hard to calculate the likelihood and timetables of the instigation of such a policy in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the Baltic. As far as Russia is concerned, such a policy will not come to fruition in the next decade, and the aforementioned self-flow will continue on a background of episodic and eclectic campaigns to increase “aid to families,” and of attempts to lower mortality and “regulate” the migrational flow into the country, the effectiveness of which is highly doubtful.

Unfortunately, another practically just-as-likely possibility of totalitarian compulsion on the population to increase fertility may be repressive taxes on bachelors, childless couples and one-child families, restrictions that prohibit young people from exiting the country before their thirtieth birthday, and the tightening of divorce laws, etc.

The least probable situation in the next fifteen years would be a complete turnaround in public opinion, public organizations, and political parties and the government to a systematic organization of action to facilitate inseparable families with several children.

We have tried to use Russia’s example to take into consideration three social scenarios, while we work out a fertility projection and population forecast for the years leading to 2050. First of all, we shall note that during this socio-
analytical rhetoric about future fertility trends, we must operate through hypothetical models, because we lack research data in world science about a demographic policy’s effect on human fertility.

There is no data on the level of a socio-demographic experiment about how separate marriage cohorts react to introduced social changes, the concurrence between the series of controlled variables and the total fertility rate, and in what measure there can be coincidences or divergences caused by a component of the reproductive behavior structure. And the question remains about the duration of this driving effect on the current social behavior of raising one- and two-child families. There are no historical analogs to this process; what’s more, the behavior of having many children has been around for more than two hundred years.

In the given report, we postulate a thirty-year period of residual effect from today’s norms of having few children, in accordance with a low fertility level under conditions of an active policy that heightens the status of families with three children. It is impossible to say whether this is too much or too little, but it would be incorrect to indicate a total lack of steering in this forecast. On the other hand, current social norms of childbearing will only get stronger in the case of rejecting an active demographic policy, and through this, the driving effect will intensify, along with the residual period of its effect; that is, a greater opposition to a possible future change in reproductive trends.

In the situation of “self-flow” (without an active policy), we postulate a continuance of the previous rate of declining fertility in the first decade, and then a two-fold decrease in second decade, a three-fold decrease in the third, and an even larger decrease between 2031 and 2050. We assume that the gap between the total fertility rate and general reproductive attitudes will narrow in all instances of refusing to implement a policy that encourages three-child families in the third to fifth decades of the current century.

Simultaneously, this will cause the gap to close between the desire for children and the actual number of children in a family. A similar removal of the dissonance between the behavioral result and the stimulus toward it will mark the beginning of a new demographic era, when there will not be forced results of reproductive behavior and psychological (dispositioned) manipulation (in the form of references to outward hindrances to achieving one’s desired number of children), in accordance with the compensation of contradiction between the circumstances that lead to action and the actions themselves. In other words, under conditions of an almost universal practice of having one child, the spreading of voluntary childlessness will not be accompanied by the familiar grimace, “I really want children, but social conditions do not allow it.” Contemporary culture, or the “self-flow,” is allowed by extra-familial civilization, and sooner or later leads to the liquidation of the moral bearings on family values and to the eradication of the need to justify to oneself and others the unwillingness to have children, and the refusal to have even one child.

Based on the aforementioned, we can describe three variants of the dynamics of the hypothetical fertility and population forecasts for the country until the year 2051. In each of these variants, a pro-family policy for encouraging three- to four-child families is not begun until 2015 because of a predominating public opinion based on modernist and feminist attitudes, the presence of political and economic preferences among influential circles that devalue the family, and a refusal by most specialists to examine low fertility and having few children as a scientific and social problem.

In the first variant (self-flow), the final result is pathetic—a total fertility rate of 0.7 will reduce the country’s population to eighty-three million people.

In the second variant of the projection between 2015–2030, we forecast a departure from a truly democratic policy of family-strengthening, the victory of advocates for not a persuasive, but a punitive demographic policy—a policy of restrictions and limitations: that is, a black policy of the whip. A refusal in the first decade, even from economic measures of bettering conditions for those in society who want children, and a black policy of restrictions in the second decade will lead to the total fertility rate’s dropping to 0.7–0.8. On a background of conflicting public opinion and politicians’ and journalists’ demographic ignorance, the effectiveness of the policy’s prohibitions will not become apparent immediately, which in the subsequent years will lead to removing earlier implemented restrictions and the acceptance of half-hearted material incentives for two- and three-member families, and, in the end, a total-fertility drop to 0.6, through which the overwhelming majority of one-child couples will add themselves to the growing prestigious-elite subclass of voluntarily childless couples and a sexual parking lot of singles. According to this variant, Russia’s population will contract to sixty-nine million people.

The most interesting variant is the third, where politicians accept a drastic pronatal policy in 2015 and where weighty financial incentives are introduced in the first decade. Here, in pure form, the result of the lag effect from the norm of having few children is shown and lasts for thirty years, leading to a population reduction to 107 million in 2050. Growth begins in 2051. However, a return to current population levels (143.7 million) is possible only in 2080. In the former two population variants, the population decline will continue beyond the end of the twenty-first century.

The compilation of the socio-demographic descriptions of fertility projection variants demonstrates the difference in social scenarios under identical total fertility rates and under various social influences on the components of planned
reproductive behavior structure. In the previously-presented scenarios, there are only systematically designated interconnections between social changes and the dynamics of the national reproductive attitude, hidden behind the hypothetical dynamics of the total fertility rate. The clarification of the type of interactions on a background of special research makes up a vital task of explanatory demography.

At the present time, there is no foundation to hope for a real change in direction by governments and political and societal organizations toward jumpstarting fertility. If current conditions are preserved as they are now (i.e., an anti-family direction of all social institutions), and if some amendments are introduced into existing aid programs, regardless of the economic situation, then a similar “self-flow” will take place (even under gradual growth in the national standard of living). The value system of anti-family achievements will only grow stronger.

In the case of making conditions easier for keeping and raising children in a family, the total fertility rate, of course, will slightly increase, but only without a rise in the national attitude of having children. If, along with these measures (however immediately they may come about), some serious steps are made to increase the prestige of having a family and children, then we will be able to observe an increase in the proportion of families with two to three children among marital cohorts between 2010 and 2020. The socialization of youngsters in an atmosphere of “familyism” can provide the newlywed cohort in the third decade with a heightened desire for children. But in order to notice growth in families with a moderate number of children it is necessary to restructure all social activities in the spirit of an active pro-family policy.

Today, the deepening of the world demographic crisis places before all governments a complex of practical tasks. A market economy in its own nature is oriented toward the accumulation of capital, toward growth in the production of mass-demand goods. The depopulation process operates in spite of this economic vector—a lack in labor force from super-low fertility and a growth in the proportion of the unskilled contingent are only surface phenomena, and the first negative consequences of the inability of this cohort to produce children who can compensate those who are leaving—not only in the sense of restocking numbers, but also in socio-cultural aspects. The severity of the problem of economic development under conditions of depopulation requirements for that economy—switching production of goods and services for children; the building of kindergartens, schools, hospitals, etc.; a reduction in the branches of the national economy which have been destroyed by depopulation; a need for an abrupt increase in labor effectiveness in connection with the population’s ability; and growth of the demographic burden on labor resources. All of this can lead to a drop in gross national product and national income, and steer the social system into deadlock. The qualities of a market economy cannot be combined with the simultaneous effects of coming to a halt in a demographic catastrophe.

Refusing to strengthen the institution of a family with several children, which is making itself apparent in the transition to a policy of half-measures and bureaucratic slyness, or to a focused struggle with depopulation by means of only an immigration policy or through diverting attention to bolstering public health and welfare of children who are already born, is connected less with lowered economic expenses and troubles, than with supporting three-child families with a low chance of divorce. However, it portends much greater losses in ten to fifteen years. It is impossible to think seriously that diverting attention to an immigration policy can save the world from depopulation.

Notes

2. Ibid. The year when maximum real GDP was reached is indicated beside every marker in italics, along with that value in PPP in US dollars.


7. By depopulation in the strict sense of the word, we mean a decrease in the population as a consequence of low and super-low fertility at a TFR less than the simple reproduction level, insufficient to compensate for a very low (or very high) mortality rate. Therefore, depopulation currently has a place only in countries where population decline happens on a stage of very high life expectancy from birth; i.e., only in Western Europe and also in a few Eastern European countries (Czech Republic and Slovenia). The situation in the CIS and Baltic is different, due to ultra-high mortality, especially prevalent among the male population. When referring to these countries it is better to define the situation as expedited depopulation. In connection to this, it is permissible to use the term depopulation for signifying any reduction, when mortality exceeds fertility. A situation where population drops due to a large negative out-migration has no connection to depopulation.
