The Question Raised by **Lawrence:**
Marriage, the Supreme Court and a Written Constitution

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In **Lawrence v. Texas,** the Supreme Court concluded that state legislatures could not criminalize homosexual sodomy.¹ Many (including Justice Scalia in dissent) noted that **Lawrence** raises a serious question regarding the future of marriage: Can marriage any longer be defined as the union of a man and a woman?² But **Lawrence** also raises another sober question: Does America still have a written Constitution?³ The answers are unknown.

As a result, and depending upon who is speaking, the President and the Senate are either preserving, ignoring, rewriting, or destroying the Constitution each time an individual is nominated or confirmed to the federal bench.⁴ Because of decisions like **Lawrence**,⁵ the selection of those who determine “what the Constitution means now” has become one of the Nation’s most contentious political issues.⁶ The federal judiciary is no longer the “least dangerous branch,” as contemplated by Federalist

*Jacob Reynolds and John Nielsen provided able research and editorial assistance in preparing the final version of this written testimony. The views expressed herein, however, are those of the author.

¹ 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
² 539 U.S. at 604.
⁴ The recent, politically based arguments made during the nomination and confirmation of Chief Justice John Roberts demonstrates that Members of the Senate – as well as the President and the American people – rather firmly believe that the “text” of the Constitution depends, in large measure, upon the personal views of the individuals who sit on the Nation’s highest court. See, e.g., Roberts is chief; now who’s next?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005 at 1A (Bush calls John Roberts a “faithful guardian of the Constitution”); A new era begins as Roberts takes oath Top justice OK’d despite Democrat holdouts; pivotal issues await, The Dallas Morning News, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1A (wherein Senator Kennedy fears that Roberts will reverse the progress of equal protection gained over the last few decades).
⁵ 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
⁶ Even the process of judging has become politicized. In determining “what the Constitution means now,” individual Justices frankly admit they consider possible political reactions to their individual votes. For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), not because Roe was correctly decided, but because three Justices concluded that their departure from the “central holding” of Roe might appear “political” and therefore undermine the Court’s “legitimacy.” See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (reasoning that a “decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy”).

Constitutional decision making based upon judicial perceptions of current political trends renders constitutional law particularly unstable. As Justice Scalia noted in the first paragraph of his dissent in **Lawrence:**


539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
advocates such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. Rather, the anti-Federalist essayist Brutus, who was fiercely critical of the potential power of the Article III courts, provides a more accurate description of modern constitutional law, where “it is impossible . . . to say” what “the principles are, which the courts will adopt,” except that they “may, and probably will, be very liberal ones” that are not confined to the “letter” of the Constitution.

The views of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton – not Brutus – carried the day in 1789. The Constitution was adopted by a Founding Generation which assumed that, while the document would be subject to amendment and interpretation, the amendment process was vested where it belonged – in the hands of “the People” – with the interpretative process safely left to judges who would apply (but not create) the law. These assumptions of Madison and Hamilton, however, are seriously out-of-place in a world where lawyers, law professors, politicians and even Supreme Court Justices are fixed upon the purported virtues of “a living Constitution” – a Constitution so “alive” that its meaning changes with each new appointment to the federal bench.

How did America’s fundamental political charter become so vaporous that the Nation’s entire political structure trembles each time a new Justice is named to the Supreme Court? The genealogy of Lawrence tells the tale.

Lawrence relies upon a constitutional right not set out in the actual language of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment – the increasingly ubiquitous modern “right of privacy.” This right was first announced by the Supreme Court in its 1967 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.
The case involved the State of Connecticut’s legislative decision to regulate the use of condoms by married couples – a law that, in the mid-1960’s, was quaint and anachronistic. But rather than wait for the ordinary processes of democratic debate to adjust state policy, the Supreme Court assumed the task of freeing the electorate of Connecticut (and America in general) from a law the dissenting Justices called “silly.” The Court emancipated the country from the bonds of silliness by noting that the Connecticut law regulated the marital relationship, a union between a man and a woman, that was – in the words of the Court – “intimate to the degree of being sacred.” This sacred relationship, the Court concluded, must be supported by a “right to privacy,” even though the Constitution nowhere mentions the right.

The Court did not consider whether its new analysis was consistent with the long-standing history and traditions of the American people. It could not undertake such an analysis because any careful review of actual historical practices would have shown that – however out-of-touch Connecticut’s law appeared in the middle of the 1960’s sexual revolution – states throughout the nation had regulated the sexual conduct of married and unmarried citizens by means of adultery, incest and fornication laws from the dawn of the Republic. The policies animating these laws (as noted by the concurring opinion in *Griswold*) may have seemed less “silly” in 1967 than a prohibition on condom usage, but adultery, incest and fornication laws are rather hard to distinguish on constitutional grounds from Connecticut’s regulation of marital fecundity. As the dissenting Justices pointed out, nothing in the text of the Constitution invalidated Connecticut’s law simply because it was “unreasonable” or “unwise.”

13 See generally 539 U.S. 558. “Privacy” has become one of the key concerns when potential Supreme Court nominees are considered, as evidenced during the John Roberts confirmation process. *I Come Before the Committee With No Agenda. I Have No Platform*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A28 (Senators Specter and Feinstein announced their specific intent to address privacy rights at the outset of the meetings).
14 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart and Black, J.J., dissenting).
16 381 U.S. at 486.
17 Id.
19 The concurring opinion noted that Connecticut’s policy was essentially a “birth-control law,” because “of the admitted widespread availability to all persons in the State of Connecticut, unmarried as well as married, of birth-control devices for the prevention of disease, as distinguished from the prevention of conception.” 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg and Brennan, J.J., and Warren, C.J., concurring). The concurring Justices, however, ignored the fact that state condom-use policies which encourage child bearing by married couples, like state adultery laws which encourage sexual fidelity by married couples, both express political and moral judgments regarding the social value and utility of certain sexual practices within marriage; political and moral judgments that are distinguishable from each other only as a matter of degree. Which regulation, prohibiting a married couple’s use of condoms or prohibiting any expression of extra-marital sexuality, “intrudes” more “significantly” on the “sexual rights” of the marital partners? This inquiry could be answered in various ways by various analysts. Nevertheless, while the concurring Justices found Connecticut’s interest in prohibiting one method of birth control unconstitutional, they had no difficulty whatsoever in announcing that the constitutionality of adultery statutes was “beyond doubt.” Id.
20 As Justice Black’s extensive dissent, joined by Justice Stewart, emphasized:
Because neither the words of the Constitution nor the specific history and traditions of the American people invalidated Connecticut’s law, the Court was required to fashion a new analysis that would set aside the state’s condom policy.  Accordingly, the Court announced that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras” (or partial shadows) that give the actual wording of the Constitution “life and substance.”

In real life, the substance of shadows (and particularly partial shadows) is questionable and they result from the lack, not the presence, of light. Nevertheless, relying upon dimness, the sacred nature of marriage and the talismanic word privacy, the Court walked away from the specific guarantees of the United States Constitution as well as the history, experience and traditions of the American people. The judicial journey begun in \textit{Griswold} has now brought into constitutional doubt the “sacred” union of “marriage” upon which \textit{Griswold} itself rests. As a result, Americans must act – not only to protect the union lauded in \textit{Griswold} – but to reinstate what Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803 called “the greatest improvement on political institutions” achieved in America: the establishment of “a written constitution.”

Legal scholars applauded the rather startling analysis of \textit{Griswold}. They wrote elaborate justifications for the use of “privacy analysis” to abolish legislative anachronisms with a minimum of fuss and bother. They

381 U.S. at 520-521 (Black and Stewart, J.J., dissenting).

While the result in \textit{Griswold} is rarely criticized, the legal soundness of the \textit{Griswold} analysis has been questioned. See, e.g., Michael A. Woronoff, Note, \textit{Public Employees or Private Citizens: The Off-Duty Sexual Activities of Police Officers and the Constitutional Right of Privacy}, 18 U. Mich. J. Reform 195, 198-201 (1984) (noting that even though the outcome of a case may be correct under \textit{Griswold}, the logic of the case “remains unconvincing.”).


381 U.S. at 484:

[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. \textit{See Poe v. Ullman}, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

24 \textit{See Woronoff, note 21, above, at 198-201.}

25 \textit{Griswold}, 381 U.S. at 486 (noting that “[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred”).


paid little heed to Justice Black’s warning that *Griswold* had dramatically altered the meaning of the Bill of Rights by “substitut[ing] for the crucial word or words” of various constitutional guarantees “another word” – privacy – that could be “more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning” than the Constitution’s original text. They similarly ignored the warning that *Griswold*’s broad notion of a “living Constitution” threatened the very existence of the “written Constitution” lauded by John Marshall.

In the rush to support the purportedly enlightened approach of *Griswold*, too many Americans – including citizens, lobbyists, lawyers, law professors and judges – seemed to forget that constitutional law involves much more than ensuring “proper” results in particular (even silly) cases. Those who drafted the document viewed the Constitution’s distribution of decision making power between and among the various branches of state and federal government as its most important role; the very foundation of American liberty.

Because various results may be “proper” at different times and in different circumstances, the constitutional distribution of decision making power in 1789 was – and remains today – profoundly important.

The Constitution was not drafted to resolve every difficult, troublesome and/or controversial issue of public policy. In the areas where it speaks rather clearly, the Constitution leaves final decision making

28 *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black and Stewart, J.J., dissenting).

29 See, e.g., *Marbury*, 5 U.S. at 178. As Justice Black explained in his *Griswold* dissent:

> I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old fashioned I must add it is good enough for me.

30 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, no. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), no. 51 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton), no. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (all discussing the importance of separation of powers as the primary security for the freedom and liberty of the American people), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_1s11.html.

31 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504, n. 17 (1999) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)) (“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”).

32 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J. dissenting). Justice Harlan criticizes what he calls a “current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court: This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process. For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending process.

*Id.* (emphasis in original).
authority with the judiciary. If state or federal governments exercise power in a manner that encroaches upon core constitutional values (as set out in constitutional text construed in light of the actual practices, experience and traditions of the American people), the judiciary must act to protect those values. But the drafters of the American Constitution believed this judicial role would be exceptional and rarely invoked. As the Federalist papers proclaim, the judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch because judges do not create policy but merely exercise “judgment.” The really difficult questions, the Founders thought, were left to the people.

The Supreme Court has departed from the decision making structure established by the Founders on more than one occasion. Prior to Griswold and Lawrence, the most recent period of judicial excess was ended

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33 The Federalist, no. 78, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_1s11.html (Hamilton) (emphasizing that if the legislature were to pass a law that were contrary to one of the clauses of the constitution then it would remain to the courts “whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”).

34 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (Court notes that it “begin[s], as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices”).


36 Id. (asserting that the judicial invalidation of a legislative act would be quite rare since “it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution” to strike down “legislative invasions” of the Constitution “instigated by the major voice of the community”).

37 As The Federalist, no. 78, explains:

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”

Id. (emphasis added).

38 All of the Court’s departures from constitutional text can be explained as judicial attempts to keep the Constitution in “tune with the times.” History, however, demonstrates that keeping the Constitution “in tune with the times” is a questionable enterprise at best. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise. Under the terms of that compromise, which was merely one part of an on-going attempt to negotiate a political resolution of the slavery question – Congress prohibited slavery in Missouri. 60 S.Ct. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring). Dred Scott, the son of slaves forcibly brought to America from Africa, claimed that he, his wife and his children had been freed when their master brought them to Missouri. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Taney, concluded that this congressional action violated the slave owners “due process” rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution:

which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.

Dred Scott, 60 S.Ct. at 450.

According to the majority opinion, “due process” protected Mr. Sandford’s “property” – his ownership of Mr. and Mrs. Scott and their children – despite the express language of Article VI, § 3 of the Constitution, which authorized Congress to “make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Prior to Dred Scott, congressional power to enact the sort of legislation struck down by Chief Justice Taney’s opinion had never been doubted. Article VI, § 3 of the Constitution previously had been interpreted by Chief Justice John Marshall as conferring broad power on Congress to make all regulations deemed appropriate for the governance of territories and new states. See, e.g., The American Insurance Company v. Canter, 26 U.S. 541, 542 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.) (the Territory of Florida was “governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution, which empowers ‘Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States’) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 3).

Dred Scott is the Supreme Court’s first reported opinion invoking a free-wheeling “substantive due process” liberty analysis; an approach characteristic of Griswold, Roe and subsequent cases. See, e.g., Casey v. Reproductive Health Services, 505 U.S. 833,
(at least in part) by President Roosevelt’s famous threat to “pack the Court” in 1937. From the late 1890’s to the mid-1930s, the Justices of the Supreme Court invalidated various state and federal legislative judgments on the ground that they unduly interfered with the “liberty” of American citizens. Back then the unwritten freedom that the Court enforced was not privacy, but economic liberty.

In *Lochner v. New York*, for example, the Court struck down a law establishing a 10-hour workday for bakery employees who labored near hot and dangerous wood- and gas-fired ovens. Why was this seemingly sensible regulation unconstitutional? Because, by setting a limit on the number of hours an employee could

998 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“*Dred Scott . . . rested upon the concept of ‘substantive due process’ that the Court praises and employs today*”). *Dred Scott’s* departure from constitutional text made the Nation’s bloodiest conflict – the Civil War – inevitable by making political resolution of the slavery question impossible.

Following the Civil War, the Nation adopted the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to reverse the holding in *Dred Scott*. For a relatively brief period following their adoption, the Supreme Court applied the express language of these important amendments to invalidate state efforts to discriminate against the Nation’s former slaves. In *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), for example, the Court invalidated a state law excluding former slaves from serving on juries. The Court noted that the 14th Amendment was crafted precisely to ordain that:

> the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color[.]

See also *Railroad Company v. Brown*, 84 U.S. 445, 452 (1873) (invalidating attempt by railroad to comply with the commands of the 14th Amendment and implementing congressional legislation by providing separate but equal “accommodations for” Blacks; the Court noted that Congress had required “equal treatment” in the operation of the railroad and rejected the company’s “ingenious attempt to evade a compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement”); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating municipal regulatory regime that routinely denied business licenses to Chinese residents; “the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for [the license denial] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified”).

Less than 20 years after *Strauder*, however, with its decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court turned its back on a strict textual application of the 14th Amendment, concluding that a railroad’s provision of “separate but equal” railway cars for White and Black passengers complied with all relevant constitutional commands. The opinion’s refusal to follow the path marked by cases such as *Strauder*, *Railroad Company* and *Yick Wo* was rather obviously influenced by the Court’s perception of current political trends. The majority opinion attempted to justify its departure from constitutional text by citing as authoritative precedent, not its own prior opinions interpreting the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, but opinions from state courts that may well have been motivated to uphold and sanction various discriminatory actions. See, e.g., *Plessy*, 163 U.S. at 550 (distinguishing *Yick Wo* by, among other things, citing five state cases discussing various discriminatory state programs). The Court feebly attempted to justify its retreat from express constitutional language and its realignment with current political views by asserting that:

> [T]he underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument . . . [is] the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.

163 U.S. at 550. Justice Harlan, in dissent, noted that the express terms of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments prohibited the officially supported discrimination involved in *Plessy*. 163 U.S. at 555. He concluded that, “[i]n my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the *Dred Scott Case*” Id. at 559.

Justice Harlan was right.

It took the Court over 50 years to begin correcting the constitutional error it condoned in *Plessy*. See, e.g., *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Without question, the process of eliminating the lingering effects of slavery would have been difficult even if the Court had followed the path set in *Strauder*, *Railroad Company* and *Yick Wo*. The Court’s 50-year departure from the text of the post-Civil War Amendments, however, has made a difficult process seem nearly impossible. More than 50 years since *Brown*, the norms enshrined in the language of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendment remain aspirations rather than realities. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (opinions struggling with the difficult issues posed by affirmative action programs, “reverse” discrimination, and the general social unrest caused by long-delayed achievement of racial equality).

39 See Mary Murphy Schroeder, *The Ninth Circuit and Judicial Independence: It Can’t Be Politics as Usual*, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 4-5 (2005)(giving a short story of the court packing plan and how Roosevelt did not want to be held to the “horse and buggy days” of the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
41 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
work, New York had unduly interfered with the right of free men to negotiate their own terms of employment.\textsuperscript{42} In the 1920s, the shadows of the Constitution protected a rather unusual constitutional right indeed: the “right” of New York bakers to work themselves to death.\textsuperscript{43}

By 1936, cases like \textit{Lochner} threatened to invalidate the Roosevelt Administration’s efforts to ease the economic suffering caused by the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{44} Various provisions of the New Deal interfered with economic rights highly valued by the Justices.\textsuperscript{45} After the Supreme Court invalidated parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act\textsuperscript{46} and the Agricultural Adjustment Act\textsuperscript{47} in 1935 and 1936, President Roosevelt went on the offensive. Following his election to a second term, in one of his famous “fireside chats,” he threatened in 1937 to appoint a new Supreme Court Justice for each one of the “nine old men” on the Supreme Court over the age of 70.\textsuperscript{48} These Justices, the President declared, were “out of touch” with the needs of ordinary Americans, the economic realities of the day, and even the intentions of the Founders.\textsuperscript{49} Such a strong message from a popular president prompted Congress to hold hearings on the proposal, but before any changes were made, the Supreme Court abandoned its enforcement of non-enumerated constitutional liberties and the president abandoned his plan to pack the Court.

Between December 1936 and the end of the first quarter of 1937, the Supreme Court made an abrupt about-face. On the heels of President Roosevelt’s challenge, the Court began to implicitly condemn its prior decisions as unwarranted judicial departures from the text of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{50} Rather than invalidating legislation because it restricted the unenumerated economic liberties of American citizens, the Court wrote regarding the obligation, duty and privilege of free men and women to govern themselves by debating and deciding difficult questions of social and economic policy.\textsuperscript{51} The Court seemingly recalled (and conducted its business pursuant to) Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous dictum in \textit{Marbury v. Madison}\textsuperscript{52} that “the framers

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\item \textsuperscript{42} Id. at 57.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Lochner} is generally considered the great “progenitor” of the modern substantive due process cases discussed below. See David E. Bernstein, “Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,” 92 GEO. L. J. 1, 13 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{44} See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, \textit{When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis}, 108 YALE L. J. 2077, 2079-80, 2082-87 (citing various cases and some of Roosevelt’s reactions to them leading up to the introduction of his court-packing plan).
\item \textsuperscript{46} See \textit{Schecter Poultry}, 295 U.S. 495; \textit{Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan}, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
\item \textsuperscript{47} See \textit{Butler}, 297 U.S. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., \textit{West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish}, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling \textit{Adkins v. Children’s Hospital}, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) by upholding minimum wage legislation); National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. \textit{Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.}, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act).
\item \textsuperscript{51} See \textit{Jones & Laughlin}, 301 U.S. at 30 (discussing the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislative enactments).
\item \textsuperscript{52} 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
\end{itemize}
of the Constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”

Throughout the early 1960’s, the Court regularly opined regarding the dangers of enforcing judicially preferred policies, in disregard of the text, structure and history of the American Constitution. Unfortunately, Griswold (and subsequent privacy cases) paid little heed. The contraception law in Griswold was, as Justice Stewart observed, “uncommonly silly” and outdated. But however proper the result in Griswold seemed (and still seems today), the analysis launched by the case encouraged social activists, lawyers, law professors and judges to increasingly ignore that Article III does not establish the federal courts as the perpetual censor of unreasonable legislation or as the ultimate arbiter of all divisive moral controversies.

Most legislative and executive decisions are not controlled (and cannot be controlled) by the presciently precise language of the Constitution. If the “correct” answers to pressing questions are fairly debatable, those questions must be – indeed, should only be – resolved by legislative action. The “correct” answers to such questions as the appropriate level of welfare assistance, the purity of the nation’s air, and the sexual conduct of its citizens are fairly debatable and, therefore, left for resolution by state and national legislatures.

This is particularly true when government action involves moral questions. And although it seems almost prehistoric to note that government action implicates moral issues, questions of morality abound in government decision making. The all-too-common contention that “government has no business regulating morality” makes a good sound bite, but not much sense. Governmental decisions always involve striking a balance between competing moral values. To whom should society pay welfare benefits? How much? When? These and thousands of other questions addressed daily by government necessarily will be resolved in favor of

53 Id. at 179-180 (emphasis in original).
54 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963) (stating that “intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments” characterized a number of past decisions, but that “[t]he doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely – has long since been discarded”).
55 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 528-31 (Stewart and Black, J.J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 531 (“it is not the function of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community standards. We are here to decide cases agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. It is the essence of judicial duty to subordinate our own personal views, our own ideas of what legislation is wise and what is not. If, as I should surely hope, the law before us does not reflect the standards of the people of Connecticut, the people of Connecticut can freely exercise their true Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights to persuade their elected representatives to repeal it. That is the constitutional way to take this law off the books”).
57 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Court refuses review state-provided benefits under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
58 See, e.g. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (construing respective rights and duties of state and federal governments in implementing the Clean Air Act).
61 See Dallin H. Oaks (former Chicago Law Professor, Justice on the Utah Supreme Court, and Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation), Religious Values and Public Policy, ENSIGN, Oct. 1992, at 60 (address given 29 February 1992 to the Brigham Young University Management Society, Washington, D.C. stating that there is scarcely a piece of legislation that is not founded on some conception of morality; the issue is merely “whose morality and what legislation”). See also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (“The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”).
one moral view or another. The “right to privacy,” enunciated in *Griswold* and expanded in cases thereafter,\(^{62}\) has rendered the American legal system increasingly oblivious to the reality that debatable moral and ethical questions are poor candidates for judicial resolution.

Following *Griswold*, the privacy right supposedly founded on the “sacred” institution of “marriage” was extended to unmarried couples,\(^{63}\) a substantive result that (again) sparked little disagreement.\(^{64}\) But the Court’s expansion of privacy to include abortion in *Roe v. Wade*\(^ {65}\) revealed how easy it is for judges to stumble when walking through constitutional shadows. *Roe* starkly revealed the *kinds* of questions the Court (rather than the people) would decide under the penumbral “right to privacy.”

The *Roe* Court took pains to explain that abortion was particularly well suited for judicial resolution *precisely because* it involved (among other things\(^ {66}\)) “the difficult question of when life begins;” a question upon which the Court need not “speculate as to the answer.”\(^ {67}\) But, despite this disclaimer, the Court announced that a woman could terminate the life of an unborn child for any (or no) reason at any time prior to the point when the child could live outside the womb.\(^ {68}\) By providing a speculative response (“life,” or at least legally cognizable “life,” begins at “viability”\(^ {69}\)) to a question the Court purportedly did not need to “answer,”\(^ {70}\) the unusual contours of the a-constitutional right of privacy at last drew significant attention.\(^ {71}\) Philosophers, ethicists and many Americans recognized that the utilitarian reasoning of *Roe* raised a host of disconcerting questions.\(^ {72}\) For the first time since *Griswold*, many Americans paused. It seemed the Court might, too.

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\(^{62}\) For a good discussion of the development of the privacy right as it relates to sexual issues, see Donald H. J. Hermann, *Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right to Privacy: Sex and the Constitution*, 54 DePaul L. R. 909 (2005).


\(^{64}\) See John Hart Ely, *The Wages of Crying Wolf*, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973) (explaining that the results of *Griswold* and subsequent cases were so popular that criticisms were like crying “wolf;” such that when the Court abandoned all pretense of judicial restraint with *Roe v. Wade*, few listened to the serious separation of powers issues raised by the case).


\(^{66}\) Id. at 116-17. (“We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.”).

\(^{67}\) Id. at 159. (“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”).

\(^{68}\) Id. at 163-64, 166.

\(^{69}\) Id.

\(^{70}\) Id. at 159.


\(^{72}\) The willingness of the Court in *Roe* to balance the value of unborn human life against a woman’s claim to privacy, led inevitably to claims that the Constitution also protects a right to assisted suicide – or “active” euthanasia, a position – so far – rejected by the Court. *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting assertion that the right to assisted suicide is protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). But *Roe* raises other ethical issues as well. For a recent example, see Larry L. Palmer, *Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A Voice of Caution*, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 237, 255 & n.89 (2002) (explaining that “without a woman’s legal right to have an abortion . . . genetic liability claims would not be theoretically possible”).
Roe forced America (and the Court) to confront whether the Constitution, in fact, mandates judicial resolution of social controversies precisely because they are moral, divisive and difficult. The legal academy that had nurtured privacy analysis and warmly welcomed Griswold now rushed to rewrite and re-explain the Supreme Court’s astonishing decision. Thousands of pages in the law reviews were dedicated to sophisticated (and often incomprehensible and contradictory) justifications for Roe’s elimination of democratic debate and decision making at the very moment they were needed most. These obviously post hoc apologetics embarrassed the Court and for many years the Court was hesitant to lengthen the shadows of Griswold.

Indeed, in the 1986 opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court avoided the right to privacy altogether and looked (at long last) to the language of the Constitution and the teachings of long-standing American traditions and history. Because there is nothing in the language of the Constitution that directly addresses the question, Bowers concluded that states could decide whether or not to regulate homosexual conduct, even if the chosen course seemed prudish, silly or outdated. The right to privacy did not dictate a contrary result, the Court noted, because human sexuality involves debatable questions of morality that have been regulated for centuries – and might warrant regulation today. The Bowers Court also noted that homosexual behavior, unlike that involved in Griswold and Roe, “bear[s] [no] resemblance” to “family relationships,” “marriage,” or procreation.”

Even Roe underwent a transformation during this momentary waning of privacy analysis. In the 1992 decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court pointedly did not reaffirm the reasoning of Roe v. Wade. As the dissenting Justices noted, the controlling opinion for the Court could not “bring itself to say that Roe was correct as an original matter.” Caught in a difficult gap between Roe’s faulty logic and its refusal to reject Roe’s result, the Court resorted to stare decisis – a doctrine which provides that a legal question, once decided, remains decided. Roe may have gotten it wrong, the Court announced, but right or wrong the decision would stand. It looked like the right to privacy had itself become penumbral.

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73 The legal academia proposed the right to privacy nearly eight decades prior to Griswold. See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R. 193 (1890). For a good discussion on the development of the privacy doctrine generally, see Amy Peikoff, No Corn on This Cobb: Why Reductionists Should be all Ears for Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 751 (2004).
74 See authority at note 27, above.
75 See Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 808 & n.16 (1995) (criticizing Roe and citing to numerous articles attempting to provide alternative rationales for the decision). See also authority at notes 71-72, above.
76 478 U.S. 186.
77 Id. at 192-96.
78 Id. at 190.
80 Id. at 953.
81 Id. at 870-71.
But, at least in constitutional law if not in real life, never underestimate the compelling substance of partial and incomplete shadows. The decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*\(^\text{82}\) demonstrates that the Court has recovered from the bout of judicial modesty it suffered between *Bowers* and *Casey*. The penumbra of privacy is back.

*Roe* didn’t get it wrong after all. Rather, it is *Bowers* (and the hesitant approach of *Casey*) that are constitutionally suspect. *Bowers*, in fact, is reversed.\(^\text{83}\) *Lawrence* declares that the reasoning of *Bowers* – that family, marriage and procreation are sturdy enough social interests to overcome the judicially created right to privacy – is fatally flawed. According to the Court, *Griswold* was wrong, too. Forget all that talk in 1967 about the “sacred” nature of the “marital union;” privacy (following the Court’s further consideration) has *nothing at all* to do with marriage, procreation, or the bearing and rearing of children.\(^\text{84}\) Instead, privacy vests sexual partners with a constitutional entitlement to determine their “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”\(^\text{85}\) And under this “concept of existence” and “mystery of human life” clause, government may not “demean” consenting adult sexual behavior.\(^\text{86}\)

Accordingly, society may have no business making any distinction between a marital union of a man and a woman and a sexual partnership between two men, two women or (why not?) three men and four women.\(^\text{87}\) If marriage is “sacred” (as *Griswold* declared\(^\text{88}\)) can society “demean” other sexual relationships under *Lawrence* by suggesting they are not? Furthermore, can a state even require sexual fidelity between spouses? If it does, doesn’t that “demean” individuals whose “meaning of the universe” includes “open marriage”? Probably. Thus, marriage may no longer mean a man and a woman, two people, sexual exclusivity, or exclude partnerships between close relatives.\(^\text{89}\)

Thus, through the questionable logic of legal reasoning purposely freed from the tethers of the actual language of the United States Constitution and American tradition, a purported right which sprang from the centuries’ old social institution called marriage may soon become that institution’s very undoing.\(^\text{90}\) No wonder

\(^{82}\) 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

\(^{83}\) Id. at 578.

\(^{84}\) Id. at 574, 578-79.

\(^{85}\) Id. at 574.

\(^{86}\) Id. at 578.


\(^{88}\) *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 486.

\(^{89}\) Because human reproduction is impossible between partners in same-sex relationships, consanguinity rules (which generally prohibit marriage between close relatives to guard against, among other things, genetic concerns related to reproduction) would seemingly pose no obstacle to marriages between two sisters, two brothers, a mother and her daughter or a father and his son.

\(^{90}\) The concluding paragraph of *Griswold* adulates marriage:

> Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

*Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 486.
Justice Scalia notes that *Lawrence* “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite sex couples.”

Following *Lawrence*, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion to hold that the Massachusetts Constitution, although nowhere discussing or addressing the matter in its actual text, demands official recognition of same-sex marriage. In reaction to *Lawrence* and the Massachusetts decisions, voters in 11 states last November amended their state constitutions to define marriage as the union of a man and a woman. This unusual action by states ranging in political views from Mississippi to Utah to Oregon does more than prevent state courts from invoking privacy (or other judicial innovations) to redefine marriage – it also demonstrates the growing unease of Americans with expanding state and federal judicial power. Americans are becoming aware that, over the past 40 years, the judiciary’s increasing disregard of constitutional strictures has deprived them of the ability to answer many of the political questions that affect them most. Marriage is just one of the more recent questions the judges are about to take from the hands of American voters.

As a result, more than marriage is on shaky ground. So is America’s “greatest improvement on political institutions:” the idea of “a written constitution.”

The reasoning in *Lawrence* erodes democratic control of debatable – and unquestionably difficult – issues of moral concern. By substituting a potentially far-reaching (and as yet undefined) “concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” test for the actual text of the Constitution, *Lawrence* seriously erodes the ability of American citizens to engage in open and honest political discussions regarding the outcome of an unknown range of fairly debatable moral controversies. Such questions – ranging

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95 *Marbury*, 5 U.S. at 178.

96 *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 574.
from cloning and biomedical research to euthanasia and children’s rights – involve some of the most pressing issues of modern life.

After Lawrence, which democratic judgments in these areas will survive the new (and apparently individualistic and idiosyncratic) “concept of existence” and “mystery of human life” test? Who can tell? Will the long-standing definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman withstand judicial analysis? No one knows – although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s invocation of Lawrence suggests that the answer is “No.”

Throughout America, ordinary citizens, lawyers, law professors, legislators and judges obviously disagree regarding the meaning of marriage. The existence of this deep disagreement, however, demands that the people be allowed to vote on a Federal Marriage Amendment to express their constitutional views regarding the meaning, content and social role of Griswold’s sacred relationship.

Marriage is an essential and long-standing social institution with profound importance for the social health of American society. Furthermore, while it is unclear what impact judicial redefinition of marriage might have on American society, there is surprisingly general agreement that further debilitation of marriage in America would be dangerous indeed. The meaning and social role of marriage is too important – and the current health of the institution too fragile – for its meaning and future vitality to be determined by the oligarchic votes of as few as five Members of the Supreme Court. As Abraham Lincoln warned in his First Inaugural Address: “if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation . . . , the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”

97 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting the claim that the Due Process Clause establishes a constitutional right to active euthanasia; however, the Court’s analysis rests upon a textual and historical examination of the meaning of the clause – the interpretative approach rejected in Lawrence).

98 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005) (Supreme Court ascertains the content of the Eighth Amendment by relying, in part, upon the practice of foreign nations and the terms of an international treaty never ratified by the Senate). Compare id. at 1217 (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s holding rests, not upon the language of the Eighth Amendment or the history of its implementation by the American states, but upon the majority’s notions regarding “evolving standards of decency” derived in significant part from “the views of foreign courts and legislatures”).

99 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 973-74.

100 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.


102 Id. at 6-7 (noting that, since the publication of the First Edition of the Study, a careful consideration of all available social scientific studies support five new findings; among these are findings that “[a]n emerging line of research indicates that marriage benefits poor Americans, and Americans from disadvantaged backgrounds, even though these Americans are now less likely to get and stay married;” “[m]arriage seems to be particularly important in civilizing men, turning their attention away from dangerous, antisocial, or self-centered activities and towards the needs of a family;” and “[b]eyond its well-known contributions to adult health, marriage influences the biological functioning of adults and children in ways that can have important social consequences”).

103 See id (all 26 findings).

Accordingly, at the end of the day, *Lawrence* raises a fundamental question regarding the *constitutional process* for defining marriage in America. The pressing issue is whether the People or the Court should decide the outcome of a debatable, divisive, difficult – even transcendent – question of social morality. The Supreme Court’s decision in *Lawrence* portends that the meaning of marriage will soon be removed from the realm of democratic debate, adjustment, compromise and resolution. This is a serious, and profoundly suspect, matter of structural constitutional law.

America in 2005 faces the question President Roosevelt confronted in 1936 and 1937: When the precise words of the Constitution, considered in light of the country’s constitutional traditions, do not provide an indisputable answer for the resolution of a contentious moral, ethical and political question, who charts the Republic’s course? The People or the Court? This is the question raised by *Lawrence*.

All Americans should care how it is answered.

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